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The International Labor Rights Forum (ILRF) is a non-profit 501(c)(3) organization 
headquartered in Washington, DC.  Founded in 1986, ILRF serves a unique role among 
human rights organizations as an advocate for and ally with the working poor around the 
world.  ILRF believes that all workers have the right to a safe working environment 
where they are treated with dignity and respect, and where they can organize freely to 
defend and promote their rights and interests.  The core of the ILRF’s mission is to 
promote labor rights by using the labor rights clauses in existing US trade legislation, like 
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Working with allies and partners around 
the world since 1986, the ILRF has been responsible for dozens of labor rights country 
practice petitions under the GSP.  
 
ILRF currently has three labor rights petitions pending before the Office of the US Trade 
Representative (USTR). In June 2006, on behalf of an anonymous partner in Niger, ILRF 
filed a petition requesting review of the Government of Niger for its continued tolerance 
of slavery.  After consulting with the ILRF, the USTR agreed to leave the review of 
Niger open in 2007 until more progress is made toward adoption of the new draft laws 
and until public findings by the new National Commission against Forced Labor and 
Discrimination were complete. 
 
In May 2007, ILRF filed a petition against the Republic of the Philippines for permitting 
and tacitly condoning the escalating violence against trade unions in that country.  The 
petition alleges that the Government of the Republic of the Philippines has encouraged 
and is accused of being engaged in the extra-judicial killings and abductions of union 
leaders, members, organizers, and supporters through elements of the Armed Forces of 
the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National Police (PNP), local police forces, and 
private security forces.  The case was accepted in September 2007 and remains under 
review. 
 
Also in May 2007, ILRF filed a petition with the Office of the US Trade Representative 
requesting the suspension of Uzbekistan from the Generalized System of Preferences 
(GSP) program.  The petition was based on growing concerns regarding the country’s 
deteriorating human rights record within cotton production and export.  State-
orchestrated forced labor, including forced child labor, is a common practice during the 
cotton harvesting and weeding seasons.  The petition was accepted for review in 
September 2007 and remains under review. 
 
International Labor Rights Forum 
2001  S Street NW, Suite 420, Washington, DC 20009 
 2
Strong labor standards are cornerstone elements of broad-based, sustainable 
development policy, particularly in export sectors. 
 
Current US Government development-related policy is aimed at encouraging economic 
development by promoting “conditions enabling developing countries to achieve self-
sustaining economic growth with equitable distribution of the benefits.”1 To promote 
these objectives, Congress emphasized that “sustaining growth with equity” requires that 
a “majority of people in developing countries  . . . participate in a process of equitable 
growth” by being able to “influence decisions that shape their lives.”2  
 
To achieve these goals, the US employs several different development related programs, 
including the GSP program.  The purpose is to promote US policy goals related to 
development through targeted trade benefits.  As envisioned by Congress, the purpose of 
the GSP program is to “promote the notion that trade . . . is a more effective . . . way of 
promoting broad-based sustained economic development.”  When deciding, the USTR is 
instructed to examine “the effect [expanding GSP benefits] will have on furthering the 
economic development of developing countries through the expansion of their exports.”3 
 
In implementing these objectives, US Government policy recognizes the important role 
that core labor standards play toward achieving these goals. Labor rights protections are 
fundamental components to long-term, equitable development. Strong, democratic labor 
organizations are vital for promoting democratic change; improving labor laws, relations, 
policies and practices; expanding the social dialogue to encourage basic protections from 
the government; and promoting sustainable development.4 From an economic 
perspective, there is a strong correlation between the protection of core labor standards, 
including the right to freedom of association, and strong economic growth.5 Strong labor 
organizations play a key role in ensuring that the gains from global trade are shared 
across a broad spectrum of society, which promotes expansion of domestic markets and 
sustained economic development. Also, strong labor organizations play a key role in 
increasing domestic savings and investment, lessening the reliance on outside capital, and 
keeping capital gains within a country. 
 
The economic development needs for workers are often in conflict with the investment 
and production goals of corporate management, investors and national governments. For 
this reason, workers have guaranteed rights, as agreed upon by all ILO member states in 
the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. These rights are both a 
                                                 
1 See Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, PL 87-195 at Sec. 101(a)(2). 
2 Id. at Sec. 102. 
3 See 19 USC §2461(1). See also General Systems of Preferences Renewal Act of 1984, P.L. 98-573, 98 
Stat. 3019 
4 See House Report No. 98-1090, 1984 U.S.S.C.A.N. at 5111. 
5 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1996) Trade, Employment and Labour 
Standards: A Study of Core Workers Rights and International Trade. Paris: OECD. See also, Kucera, 
David. (2001) The Effects of Core Workers Rights on Labour Costs and Foreign Direct Investment: 
Evaluating the "Conventional Wisdom". Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies.; Dølvik, Jon 
Erik and Liv Tørres. (2002) Globalisation, Work, and Labour Standards. Oslo: Fafo Institute for Applied 
Social Science.  
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shield and a sword for workers to be able to capture a fair share of the value of economic 
development promoted by trade preference programs.  It also helps workers to defend 
themselves from the combined political and economic power of the state and corporations 
who often seek to violate workers fundamental rights in an effort to lower costs and 
improve competitiveness. Internationally agreed upon core labor rights provide workers 
with the basic set of tools that they need to be able to fairly bargain for the economic 
well-being of their families and communities. As a result, before deciding any country or 
product is eligible for GSP benefits, the USTR is directed to consider the impact 
extending benefits will have on broad-based economic development in the particular 
sector and countries in which the potential GSP eligible product is produced. (19 U.S.C. 
§§2461, 2463) 
 
However, since the GSP was amended to include labor standards, application of the labor 
provisions have been poor and wrought with political considerations. Despite the 
statutory right to bring labor complaints, these complaints often go ignored or drag on for 
years without any meaningful resolution. While the GSP labor petitions have led to some 
successful interventions in the past, our general experience with GSP labor petitions has 
been mixed. While some cases were addressed in a serious manner, others were not. The 
petition process has lacked transparency and finality, and other political considerations 
often trump labor concerns. In many cases, such as the current case pending against 
Uzbekistan, foreign governments under review have simply ignored the USTR without 
any negative repercussions, knowing that adverse rulings based on labor standards are 
rare. In other cases, the USTR has refused to even accept labor petitions without 
providing any reasoning or has allowed proceedings to drag on for so many years that the 
review essentially becomes meaningless. 
 
To remedy these problems, we believe that the labor criteria for all trade preference 
programs should be updated.  Reforms must be undertaken to ensure a fair and 
manageable petition review process that includes reviews for both country compliance 
and industry compliance with the labor eligibility criteria. Most importantly, as described 
above, the USTR must also have a clear understanding, achievable only through direct 
Congressional mandates, that respect for core labor rights at both the country and 
industry level.  It is a fundamental precondition to achieve the program’s goal of broad-
based sustainable development and that of any trade benefits. We believe that the reforms 
outlined below, if fully implemented and adhered to, will provide the USTR with the 
renewed mandate and the tools needed to advocate for improved working conditions in 
industries that receive preferential trade access to the US market. 
 
Recommendations to Improve GSP Labor Rights Criteria and Review Process 
 
(1)  GSP eligibility criteria must be updated to meet current international law norms 
and every country must at least meet a basic minimum labor standard. 
 
The GSP statute was amended in 1984 to create, as a mandatory eligibility criterion, the 
requirement that beneficiaries be “taking steps to afford” internationally recognized 
workers’ rights. Since that time, though, international labor standards have matured and 
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consensus regarding the core labor standards has been formed in the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. We believe, therefore, that the GSP statute 
must be updated from referring to “internationally recognized worker rights” to an 
explicit mention and recognition of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. Those rights include the right to freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, a prohibition on child labor, an end to the practice of forced labor, and the 
right to be free from discrimination. 
 
Recognizing that the core labor standards are not enough to promote to development 
goals of the GSP, as these are basic floor protections for workers, the GSP standards must 
also retain its current focus on promoting “acceptable conditions of work”, a catch-all 
that includes workplace health and safety, working hours, wages, and other prevailing 
industry practices. While stand alone “acceptable conditions at work” labor petitions are 
rarely filed if ever, violations of core labor standards are often combined with other labor 
violations in the workplace that undercut the ability of workers to fully enjoy the fruits of 
their labor. 
 
The absolute ‘floor’ standards for any country that wishes to participate in US trade 
preference programs must include the following:  
 
1) The government must demonstrate continual progress towards adopting laws 
consistent with the core labor rights listed in the ILO Declaration and as 
defined by the relevant ILO conventions, and toward achieving acceptable 
conditions of work in all industries. At the conclusion of an initial transition 
period, which shall be longer in the case of Least Developed Countries, each 
government must have adopted strong labor laws; 
2) The government and industries must not have in place any laws that prohibit, 
de facto or de jure, the exercise of a core labor right or fail to have laws that 
govern acceptable conditions of work; 
3) The government must be making continual progress during the initial 
transition period toward effective enforcement of laws related to core labor 
rights and acceptable conditions of work, assisted by appropriate USG 
capacity building funds, and effectively enforce such laws by the period’s 
conclusion; 
4) At a minimum, each government must ensure the existence of fair, equitable, 
and transparent tribunals for the enforcement of labor rights and acceptable 
conditions of work, with the possibility of remedies such as fines, penalties, or 
temporary work closures.  In addition, the venues for the appeal or review, as 
appropriate, of decisions be decided by impartial and independent tribunals.   
5) Each government must meet the State Department established criteria for 
combating trafficking of persons and not be on the Tier 3 Watch List of State 
Dept. Trafficking in Persons Report. 
 
While the above criteria represent the absolute floor that any government must meet, the 
trade preference program must have built in incentives to encourage governments and 
industries to take additional meaningful steps to ensure that the benefits from trade are 
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shared broadly.  If a “GSP plus”- type program is implemented, developing countries 
should be required to meet enhanced eligibility criteria on labor rights in order to qualify 
for these enhanced benefits. The exact nature of these enhanced benefits may vary 
depending on the local situation. For example, a government could enact laws 
establishing acceptable conditions of work or providing a living wage. Special enhanced 
labor specific development programs, such as Better Factories Cambodia, could be 
implemented. Industries and their unions could enter into specific, enforceable 
framework agreements in particular problematic sectors or, a requirement could be 
included that NO worker be excluded, de facto or de jure, from, and that all workers are 
covered equally by, the protection of national labor laws could be required.6  
 
(2)  Labor rights review processes must be more flexible and transparent with 
binding timelines for action by the US Government. 
 
The rigid schedule by which the USTR reviews country practice petitions is a significant 
constraint on the effective use of GSP to promote strong labor standards. The regulations 
promulgated by the government in 1985, and still in place, called for an annual review 
cycle for both country practice and product eligibility hearings.(15 CFR §2007.3) 
Petitions filed by June 1 are subject to an initial screening for a July 15 announcement of 
acceptance or rejection. Hearings in the fall on petitions that have been accepted are 
followed by negotiations with the BDC to secure recommended improvements in time for 
a decision to be announced April 1. In practice, however, it has not worked out that way. 
The only deadline adhered to is that of the petitioners' for submission of the initial 
petition. Particularly in recent years, as a by-product of more serious examination of 
petitions, reviews have stretched out two, three, sometimes four years without a decision. 
While this is intended to allow more substantive reviews, in the absence of regulations or 
certain schedules, it has instead tended to communicate indecisiveness. 
 
While the deadlines have been violated regularly by the government, their existence has 
made it impossible for new petitions to be filed when changes occur in a country. So, the 
one-sided flexibility has worked negatively both for countries under review and in 
preventing the initiation of reviews in response to developments. 
 
The petition process should be more accessible, more transparent, more clearly 
structured, and executive discretion should be subject to some limitations.  It should also 
allow for the consideration of both country- and sector-based petitions.  Any non-
frivolous petition should be accepted for review.   If a petition is rejected the USG should 
provide in writing a statement of explanation for the decision.   
 
The practice of a limited petition filing window should be eliminated and petitions should 
be accepted throughout the year.  Finally, clear timelines should be established: 
 
o to accept or reject a petition, with short extensions granted only in cases of 
insufficient information; 
                                                 
6 Workers that must be covered include subcontracted, temporary, migrant, seasonal, part-term, project-
based, informal sector, and other workers in similarly precarious employment situations. 
 6
o to invite additional information through an FR notice process regarding a 
petition accepted for review; 
o to hold a public hearing, if possible in the beneficiary country at issue;  
o to evaluate the petition, issue findings on the merits of its claims, and 
make recommendations to the President regarding the petition. 
 
Countries found in violation of the workers’ rights criteria should have the opportunity to 
implement a remediation plan, developed in cooperation with the USG and civil society, 
not to exceed one year in duration and accompanied by appropriate labor-related 
technical assistance and capacity building.  If the plan is not fully implemented within its 
timeframe, the TPSC should recommend benefit termination, in whole or in part, unless 
the beneficiary made a good-faith effort to implement the plan, in which case an 
extension not to exceed one year may be granted. 
 
The role of USDOL’s International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) in the review process 
should be clarified and strengthened.  ILAB should have the lead authority to determine 
whether, on its face, a workers’ rights petition should be accepted; and whether, 
following an investigation, those claims have been substantiated by the evidence. 
 
(3)  “New information” requirement for country practice petitions must be removed 
from the regulations. 
 
Another major fault in the GSP program has been the rigid requirement that new petitions 
regarding countries that have been rejected for review could not be taken up without 
providing "substantial new information." (15 CFR §2007.0 (b)). This requirement was 
badly abused in the early years of the program to reject petitions that documented 
ongoing violence against workers and unions, simply because the violence was similar to 
that which they had reviewed or refused to review in earlier years. Further, the "new 
information" requirement was utilized to reject petitions that alleged that promised 
improvements in response to earlier petitions had not been carried out, or that other 
measures taken subsequent to a GSP decision that a country was "taking steps" or making 
“continual progress” had canceled out the gains on which the earlier decision had been 
based. 
These last two points of ambiguity, "new information" and "taking steps"/ “continual 
progress”, were intended to prevent frivolous or repetitive petitions and to allow 
flexibility in administering the program. These goals are laudable and necessary. 
However, without more concise definitions of what constitutes new information, 
particularly as it relates to a failure of a country to make progress, the requirement is -- as 
has been demonstrated in practice -- an invitation for administrative abuse. Likewise, 
"taking steps"/“continual progress” is a reasonable requirement. But without further 
definition, this phrase can be -- and has been -- used to justify changes that in the 
aggregate set back the rights of workers rather than advance them. There is a clear need 
for more precise language.    
 
 7
(4) Product eligibility must be subject to the same mandatory labor criteria. 
 
When the GSP program was amended in 1984 to include protections for internationally 
recognized workers’ rights, Congress specifically intended these standards would apply 
with respect to consideration of product petitions. The statute’s drafters recognized that in 
some instances country and business development policies may undermine the long-term 
development goals for local communities. Yet, the statute establishes a bifurcated 
eligibility determination. While countries are subject to mandatory labor rights eligibility 
criteria, labor rights standards are discretionary when applied to specific products.  
 
In particular, the GSP statute grants the USTR the discretion to “limit the application of 
the duty-free treatment” accorded to a product under 19 U.S.C. §2463, which governs the 
petition process utilized by governments and industries to have their products added to 
the GSP. When doing so, the USTR is instructed to “consider the factors set forth in 
§2461 and §2462(c),” including “whether or not such country has taken or is taking steps 
to afford workers in that country (including in any designated zone in that country) 
internationally recognized workers’ rights.” 
 
As we have seen in our twenty-five years of using the GSP process, the “mandatory” 
labor rights eligibility criteria for governments has essentially become discretionary, 
subject to the prevailing politics of the day. When applied to product eligibility 
determinations, the discretionary labor rights eligibility standards have become non-
existent. Trade preference reform must make clear that product eligibility must be 
conditioned on implementation of labor eligibility criteria, just as in the case of country 
eligibility.  
 
(5)  The GSP must provide the right to file product-eligibility petitions for 
widespread labor violations in economic sectors encompassing many countries. 
 
While the current GSP review process emphasizes bilateral relations between the US and 
a trading partner, systematic labor violations in one country can be driven by the political 
economy of neighboring countries or competitors. In some cases, widespread and 
common labor abuses are concentrated in particular industries that cross international 
borders creating a situation where bilateral efforts to address systematic labor abuses will 
not be enough. The USTR must be empowered to address the multi-national labor 
violations in a multi-lateral process through the GSP program. 
 
For example, for years, the cocoa industry has been criticized for its use of child, 
trafficked and forced labor.  The “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced 
Labor” released recently by the US Department of Labor notes that child or forced labor 
has been reported in cocoa production in Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and 
Nigeria.7  Additionally, another major problems identified in the West African cocoa 
industry is the use of children who have been trafficked from neighboring countries like 
Mali, Benin, Togo and Burkina Faso into Cote d’Ivoire and other countries in order to 
                                                 
7 United States Department of Labor.  “List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor.” USDOL, 
September 2009.  Available online: http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/PDF/2009TVPRA.pdf  
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work in cocoa production.  Due to the clear transnational labor issues in the West African 
cocoa industry, a simultaneous regional approach is required to eliminate labor rights 
abuses.  While these problems have been detected in many countries producing cocoa, 
the supply chain is dominated by a small number of global trading companies – primarily 
Cargill, Archer Daniels Midland and Barry Callebaut.  Even on the consumer end of the 
supply chain, the chocolate industry is largely run by a handful of companies who are 
becoming increasingly concentrated. Due to the clear trend of labor rights issues across 
many of the top cocoa producing countries and the small number of companies involved 
in the global cocoa trade, it is necessary for companies involved in the cocoa trade to take 
an industry-wide and regional view of the problems. 
 
Cocoa is not the only product where rampant violations of core labor rights and 
acceptable conditions of work are common across countries. According to the US 
Department of Labor, forced labor and child labor are commonly used in the production 
of goods for export to the United States, including bananas from four countries, sugar 
from 15 different countries, gold from 17 different countries, and tobacco from 13 
different countries to name a few. 
 
Despite the widespread violations of core labor standards and acceptable conditions at 
work in a growing number of export sectors, filing a petition against one of the countries 
could lead to a shift in production to another eligible country. Without the firm right, 
grounded in statutory language, to file petitions to address common labor problems that 
occur across international borders in particular industries, advocates are faced with 
exacerbating labor problems in a country not currently under review by driving business 
its way while at the same time impacting the comparative advantage the country under 
review receives through the preference program. For example, gold sourced from the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is often exported, illegally in many instances, 
from neighboring Rwanda. As a result, any GSP action towards the DRC would not 
address Rwandan trade in those same products under review in the DRC. If the GSP 
action against DRC involved suspending trade benefits, Rwanda will stand to gain from 
the murky, non-transparent supply chains and may see an increase in exports of minerals 
originally from the DRC. Because some current proposals for GSP reform include 
providing 100% duty free/quota free access for products from LDCs, Rwanda may stand 
to benefit from continued labor abuses in the DRC.  
 
To resolve this dilemma, the GSP petition process should be amended to provide more 
flexibility to address multi-lateral labor problems in product specific petitions. Providing 
the USTR with the tools to address multi-lateral labor problems in the GSP program 
would not be overly burdensome or unmanageable. Currently, when a company or 
government requests expanded product eligibility for their products, often the request will 
seek the inclusion of a single product from multiple countries, so it is common practice 
for the USTR to consider the economic impact of product eligibility across different 
countries. For example, in 2008, Dole Packaged Foods, which is one of the world’s 
largest suppliers of fresh and packaged fruit, requested that certain HTS lines of 
pineapple juice be given GSP eligibility. In its §2463 petition for product eligibility and 
for a CNL waiver, Dole sought the inclusion of product lines from Indonesia, Thailand 
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and the Philippines. Because of significant concerns over labor conditions in Dole’s 
global supply chain, the ILRF intervened in the petition, requesting the USTR to open an 
examination of labor standards in pineapple production in the Philippines specifically, but 
also in the other countries that may benefit from expanded GSP access to the US market. 
As a result, Dole withdrew its request after facing significant pressure from the US 
Department of Labor and the USTR to account for its labor practices when producing 
those specific HTS lines. 
 
(6)  The GSP must also provide the right to file product-eligibility petitions for 
widespread labor violations in economic sectors within a single country. 
 
Under the current GSP statute, “any person” can file a petition calling into question the 
labor policies of a particular country. However, only “interested parties” are eligible to 
file petitions seeking to expand or limit the number of products eligible under the GSP 
program. “Interested parties” are defined as “a party who has a significant economic 
interest in the subject matter or any other party representing a significant economic 
interest that would be materially affected.” Only after a product eligibility review has 
been opened, usually at the request of governments or businesses, do labor and human 
rights advocates have the ability to engage in the review process. 
 
Advocates seeking to question compliance of particular industries with the GSP 
eligibility criteria, including labor rights, are required to bring a petition against the 
practices of each of the foreign governments independently. As a result, benefits from 
every industry in that country, including those arguably in compliance with labor 
standards, are placed at risk. Companies are left in an uncertain position regarding 
eligibility for their products. For example, in recent efforts to defend itself from 
potentially millions in liability for its role in polluting the Ecuadorian rainforest and 
seriously damaging the health of the local inhabitants, Chevron has brought a complaint 
against the Government of Ecuador for being in violation of preference program 
eligibility criteria. While the dispute focuses on the Ecuadorian government’s compliance 
with the eligibility criteria in terms of the oil export sector, all benefits from Ecuador 
have been placed at risk. Of course, while the USTR currently has the discretion to limit 
any possible suspension of Ecuador’s benefits to the oil sector, as Chevron has requested, 
Ecuadorian companies in other sectors who enjoy trade preference benefits still find 
themselves in a position where they could lose their benefits as a result of actions in 
unrelated sectors. 
 
This is not to say necessarily that the current competitiveness assessment for product 
eligibility by the USTR under §2463 should be open to any person other than an 
“interested party.” Rather, the GSP country practice review provided under §2461 should 
be amended to allow “any person” to file a sector specific petition rather than just a 
country specific petition for review.8 
                                                 
8 We do not believe, though, petitions by the USTR solely be focused only on the industries where 
significant problems occur. The USTR must be able to retain flexibility to address egregious labor 
problems in trading partners even if the labor problems are in sectors that do not receive GSP benefits. For 
example, we currently have a pending petition to revoke GSP benefits for Uzbekistan for engaging in the 
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(7)  Sector-based labor initiatives linked to trade incentives has had a positive 
impact on broad-based development. 
 
Overall, sector-based trade incentives conditioned on implementing a sector-wide labor 
program have proven successful in raising the labor standards in beneficiary countries. 
For example, under the 1999 US-Cambodia Bilateral Textile Agreement, sector 
incentives were effective in improving labor conditions.  Under the agreement 
Cambodian textile producers were offered an increased export quota on condition that the 
sector demonstrated a commitment to worker rights under the ILO-led “Better Factories 
Cambodia” initiative.  In order to attain the increased access to the US market, the 
Cambodian textile industry worked with the Cambodian government and the ILO to 
implement a far ranging labor program that led to significant improvements in labor 
standards in the industry, a stronger labor and civil society development, and an 
arbitration mechanism to resolve labor disputes in the industry. As a result the sector 
gained quota increases—by 18% in 2004 for example—and also gained foreign 
investment and 250,000 new jobs by its reputation for strong labor standards. By 
addressing development from a sectoral rather than country approach, the Cambodian 
textile industry was able to focus on implementing reforms, had clear incentives to 
improve labor standards, and has been able to hold itself out as an industry leader. 
 
Unfortunately, with the end of the Multi-Fiber Agreement, and thus the loss of significant 
trade incentives for the government and industry to continue reforms, much of the 
progress over the last 10 years is at risk. Current efforts to reform the GSP must, at a 
minimum, examine reforms to the program that will enable a sector-based approach to 
improving labor standards. 
 
Respectfully submitted on December 1, 2009. 
 
/s/ 
Brian Campbell 
Director of Policy and Legal Programs 
International Labor Rights Forum 
2001 S Street NW, Suite 420 
Washington, D.C. 20009 
ph – 202-701-3021 
e-mail: brian.campbell@ilrf.org 
                                                                                                                                                 
widespread use of forced and child labor in the harvesting of cotton for large state run companies. 
Currently, Uzbekistan only receives GSP benefits for one product, uranium. 
